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INTRODUCTION
When Joseph R. Biden and Donald J. Trump took the stage at the first 2020
presidential debate, they were the oldest major party candidates for the
presidency ever1—and one may have been contagious with a virus that is
notoriously lethal for the elderly.2 Only days after the debate, Trump was
diagnosed with COVID-19.3 His case was so severe that officials believed
he would need a ventilator,4 and Trump feared that he would die.5 Despite
being near Trump for ninety minutes, Biden subsequently tested negative for
the virus.6 Trump survived after receiving a cocktail of experimental
medications used to treat severe cases of the virus.7
Three months later, on January 6, 2021, the U.S. Congress was poised to
certify Biden’s victory, and his vice presidential running mate, Senator
Kamala D. Harris, was scheduled to participate.8 The proceedings were
disrupted by a violent mob targeting members of Congress. Some attackers
said they aimed to assassinate Vice President Michael R. Pence.9 Harris’s
arrival to the U.S. Capitol had been delayed just long enough for her to avoid

1. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: President Trump and Joe Biden Are
the Oldest Nominees for President, Ever, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2020, 8:02 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/17/health-202-president-trump-joe-bidenare-oldest-nominees-president-ever/ [https://perma.cc/WDP2-TZ98].
2. See Jamie Ducharme, The Presidential Debate Was the Kind of COVID-19 Risk
Experts Have Been Warning Us About, TIME (Oct. 2, 2020, 12:46 PM),
https://time.com/5895518/trump-coronavirus-covid-debate/ [https://perma.cc/ZE4P-WSPN];
Older Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 13, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20201213203949/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html.
3. Ducharme, supra note 2.
4. Noah Weiland et al., Trump Was Sicker than Acknowledged with Covid-19, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/trumpcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/3MFX-38KC].
5. Olivia Nuzzi, The Entire Presidency Is a Superspreading Event, N.Y. MAG.
(Oct. 9, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/donald-trump-covid-19-whitehouse.html [https://perma.cc/2JX7-6ZZ3].
6. Annie Linskey, Biden Tests Negative for Coronavirus, Campaign Says, WASH. POST
(Oct. 4, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-tests-negative-forcoronavirus-campaign-says/2020/10/04/72e65358-0653-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UG3B-5UTM].
7. Weiland et al., supra note 4.
8. Chelsea Janes, For Friends and Allies of Kamala D. Harris, Deadly Capitol Attacks
Prompt
Fresh
Fears,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
14,
2021,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/harris-fears-safety/2021/01/13/bbd3d31a-54ff11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/G3X6-N8PR].
9. Ashley Parker et al., How the Rioters Who Stormed the Capitol Came Dangerously
Close
to
Pence,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
15,
2021,
9:56
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-rioters-capitol-attack/2021/01/15/ab62e434567c-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html [https://perma.cc/QS8J-V8YJ] (“[R]ioters began
chanting, ‘Hang Mike Pence!’”).
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being present for the insurrection.10 Following the siege, authorities took
extraordinary precautions to protect Biden and Harris on Inauguration Day.11
The 2020 presidential election involved several significant threats to the
health and safety of the candidates. But dangers to presidential candidates
and presidents-elect have been present before. After winning the 1860
presidential election, Abraham Lincoln dodged an alleged assassination plot
by wearing a disguise to sneak into Washington, D.C., for his inauguration.12
A decade later, presidential candidate Horace Greeley died shortly after the
election, creating a dilemma over how the electoral votes he had won in his
losing bid should be cast and counted.13 In 1912, Vice President James
Sherman, who had been nominated for reelection, died less than a week
before his ticket lost the election.14
Less than three weeks before Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration in
1933, a gunman fired on him but instead hit five other people in Roosevelt’s
car, including the mayor of Chicago.15 In the lead-up to President
Roosevelt’s successful reelection in 1944, he suffered from ailments that
would cause his death less than three months into his new term. 16 During the
1956 campaign, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had suffered a heart
attack in 1955, obscured his health issues and then had a stroke in the year
following his reelection.17 Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, who
also concealed serious ailments while campaigning,18 faced an assassination
attempt before taking office.19 Kennedy’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy, was
a leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968 when
10. Janes, supra note 8.
11. Carol D. Leonnig et al., Secret Service Launches Massive Security Operation to
Protect Biden Inauguration, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 9:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/biden-inauguration-securitydc/2021/01/12/b1a9781a-54e9-11eb-89bc-7f51ceb6bd57_story.html [https://perma.cc/PH58FZ8M].
12. Joe Heim, The Attempted Assassination of Abraham Lincoln, WASH. POST (June 5,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-attempted-assassination-ofabraham-lincoln/2020/06/04/e05eeed8-8e3d-11ea-a0bc-4e9ad4866d21_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DF7N-BPXS].
13. See Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring
the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 56 n.246
(2012) [hereinafter First Succession Clinic].
14. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
161 (1965).
15. Ronald G. Shafer, The Scariest Moment of a Presidential Transition: Six Gunshots
Fired
at
FDR,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
13,
2020,
7:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/11/13/fdr-assassination-attempt-transitionpresident-elect/ [https://perma.cc/5N9N-MRUC].
16. Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Fifty
Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential
Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 989–90 (2017) [hereinafter Second Succession
Clinic].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 990.
19. Dan Lewis, The Kennedy Assassin Who Failed, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 6, 2012),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-kennedy-assassin-who-failed-153519612/
[https://perma.cc/8LHS-JVL7].
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he was assassinated.20 Four years later, as George Wallace campaigned for
the 1972 Democratic nomination, he was shot and left permanently paralyzed
below the waist.21
Thomas Eagleton was the 1972 Democratic nominee for the vice
presidency for only eighteen days until he stepped aside amid concerns about
his past mental health struggles.22 In the final weeks of the 1980 presidential
campaign, the man, who a year later shot President Ronald Reagan, came
within feet of President Jimmy Carter at a campaign event.23 Weeks after
President Bill Clinton won reelection in 1996, before the Electoral College
had cast its votes, a last-minute motorcade detour during a foreign trip
avoided a bridge rigged with explosives.24 In November 2000, not long
before he was declared vice president-elect, Dick Cheney had his fourth heart
attack.25
Despite previous candidate vacancies and near misses, the procedures for
how to address many of these contingencies have shortcomings. Some
scenarios are left unaddressed. The policies for other situations might be
difficult to use or could result in undemocratic outcomes. This Article
discusses possible reforms for addressing disability or death of presidential
candidates from the time they are nominated at their political parties’
conventions to when they are sworn into office on Inauguration Day.
Part I addresses the time period from the political conventions to Election
Day. The political parties should consider changing their rules to make the
vice-presidential nominee the designated successor to the presidential
nomination but give the national committees the power to override the vice
presidential candidate’s automatic succession. Additionally, the parties
should create processes for candidate inabilities and “dual vacancies” of the
presidential and vice presidential nominations. This part also discusses the
possibility of delaying an election due to death or inability, as well as policies
for encouraging candidates to be transparent about their health.
Part II addresses the period from Election Day to the date when the
Electoral College meets. If a candidate death or inability occurs in this
period, electors who are not bound by state laws to vote for the deceased or
disabled candidate could cast their ballots for replacement candidates. But
the prospect of electors and the political parties selecting replacement
candidates raises democratic legitimacy concerns because the Electoral
20. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1010.
21. Alabama Governor George Wallace Shot, HIST. (Feb. 9, 2010),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/governor-george-wallace-shot
[https://perma.cc/3TAA-UNK7].
22. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 991.
23. Id. at 1010.
24. L.A. Times Staff, U.S. Presidential Assassination and Attempts, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2012, 8:49 AM), https://timelines.latimes.com/us-presidential-assassinations-and-attempts/
[https://perma.cc/7F25-TSX5].
25. See Peter Baker & Julie Bosman, In New Book, Cheney Recalls 5 Heart Attacks and
His Brush with Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/
10/17/us/politics/in-new-book-cheney-recalls-5-heart-attacks-and-his-brush-with-death.html
[https://perma.cc/68UP-NW3H].
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College has evolved to have a purely mechanical function. State laws
requiring electors to vote for dead or disabled candidates would reflect the
principles of the electoral system, but such laws might face objections on
legal and policy grounds.
The final part addresses the period after the Electoral College votes, which
extends through Congress’s counting of the electoral votes to Inauguration
Day. The Twentieth Amendment covers death and inability during this
period, but procedures for declaring inabilities are needed. Other concerns
are raised by certain succession scenarios. If the president-elect and vice
president-elect both died or became unable to perform presidential duties, the
speaker of the House would act as president starting on Inauguration Day.
This could result in the party that lost the presidential election taking control
of the White House. Congress should eliminate this possibility by
designating legislative leaders of the president-elect’s party as the successors.
This part also considers how Congress might use its authority under Section
4 of the Twentieth Amendment to provide for the death of candidates in
contingent elections, which involve Congress choosing the winner of the
presidential or vice presidential race when no candidate receives a majority
of electoral votes. Finally, this part discusses the presidential succession
vulnerability that exists during the Inauguration Day ceremony on
January 20.
I. DEATH OR INABILITY BEFORE ELECTION DAY
The political parties’ rules authorize their national committees to fill
vacancies on the parties’ national tickets that occur after the national
conventions. The charter and bylaws of the Democratic Party call for the
more than 200 members26 of the national committee to “fill[] vacancies in
the nominations for the office of President and Vice President” by majority
vote at a special meeting called by the party chairperson.27 The Procedural
Rules of the 2020 Democratic National Convention elaborate by stating that
vacancies might occur as the result of “death, resignation or disability of a
nominee.”28 Additionally, the convention rules require the party chairperson
to “confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States Congress and
the Democratic Governors Association and [] report to the Democratic
National Committee.”29

26. About the Democratic Party, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., https://democrats.org/whowe-are/about-the-democratic-party/ [https://perma.cc/LE4R-G2J6] (last visited Sept. 17,
2021).
27. See BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. II, §§ 7(c), 8(d),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR]; CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED
STATES
art.
III,
§ 1(c),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR].
28. PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE 2020 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION r. F,
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-PermanentConvention-Rules-of-Procedure-7.30.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2QS-4SUW].
29. Id.
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The Rules of the Republican Party provide the 168-member30 national
committee with the power to fill vacancies that “may occur by reason of
death, declination, or otherwise” of the presidential or vice presidential
candidate.31 The members of the national committee would vote as part of
their state delegations to the Republican Convention, with each delegation
receiving the same number of votes that they received at the convention.32 A
replacement candidate would need to receive majority support.33 The Rules
of the Republican Party provide the alternative of reconvening the national
convention to fill any vacancies.34
A. Death of the Presidential Nominee
The parties should consider changing their rules for the death of a
presidential nominee to make the vice presidential nominee the designated
successor to the presidential nomination.35 But, to provide flexibility, the
rules should allow a majority of the national committee to override the vice
presidential candidate’s succession. After succeeding to the presidential
nomination, the new nominee should select a vice presidential nominee with
approval from a majority of the national committee.36
The U.S. Constitution makes the vice president the first designated
successor to the presidency37 because it helps ensure that there is always
someone to discharge the office’s powers and duties.38 Of course, the need
for a replacement presidential nominee is less urgent. Unlike presidents,
nominees do not need to be constantly on call to respond to crises. Yet, a
delay in appointing a new presidential nominee could still be detrimental,
especially if Election Day is close.
Under the two major parties’ current rules, a prolonged process for
selecting a replacement is possible. The parties’ national committees, which
are empowered to select a replacement nominee, consist of over 150
members from across the country.39 It is easy to imagine that the committees
would struggle to arrive at a consensus. Recent primary cycles have featured
30. Alex Isenstadt, RNC Invites 2024 Hopefuls to January Meeting in Show of Neutrality
Toward Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 2, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/
12/02/rnc-2024-hopefuls-trump-442302 [https://perma.cc/3V5E-B8TT].
31. THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2018), https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-RulesReformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2LL-FZ56].
32. See id. r. 9(b).
33. Id. r. 9(d).
34. Id. r. 9(a).
35. See FEERICK, supra note 14, at 273 (“[T]he people would likely insist that the
vice-presidential nominee be chosen to fill the vacancy.”).
36. Party rules, as opposed to laws, are preferable for candidate death and inability
procedures. Although a law applying to all parties might promote clarity and uniformity, it
would almost certainly be an infringement on the parties’ First Amendment associational
rights. See New York State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202–03 (2008) (“A
political party has a First Amendment right . . . to choose a candidate-selection process.”).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV, § 1; see also id. amend. XX, § 3.
38. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 132 (2005).
39. See About the Democratic Party, supra note 26; Isenstadt, supra note 30.
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rivalries between various wings of the parties.40 These tensions could
reemerge in the process of selecting a replacement. Although there would be
a political imperative to quickly and decisively coalesce around a
replacement,41 forging agreement among over 150 people on such a
consequential decision still presents a major challenge, especially when the
parties appear to lack a detailed process for doing so.
A failure to quickly select a replacement nominee could damage the
party’s chances for winning the presidency. It could also harm the country’s
democracy. The two-party system counts on both parties presenting voters
with a choice between two credible nominees about whom the voters have
enough time to learn. By the time presidential candidates have received their
parties’ nominations at the conventions, they have been campaigning for at
least a year and have been the focal points of their parties’ nationally
televised conventions. It would be essential for replacement nominees to use
all of the remaining time until the election to introduce themselves to the
public. A significant delay would deprive voters of the opportunity to cast
informed votes and could even cause confusion at the polls. If a replacement
was not named in time to update ballots, or at least to sufficiently educate the
public, some voters may not even know for whom they were voting.
A replacement candidate chosen by party leadership might lack legitimacy
due to the absence of a popular mandate. The original presidential nominee
would have received the support of millions of voters during the primaries,
while the replacement candidate may have received no support from primary
voters. For much of the country’s history, political party leaders selected
their parties’ presidential nominees.42 But over the past half-century, the
principle that primary voters should select presidential nominees has become
firmly entrenched.43 The democratic legitimacy held by the presidential
nominee would best be replicated by the vice presidential nominee’s
succession to the nomination. Even though the vice presidential nominee
might not have run in the primaries, the presidential nominee would have
selected the vice presidential nominee—another norm that has emerged
40. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, A Major Fear for Democrats: Will the Party Come
Together by November?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/
us/politics/democratic-party-unity-primary.html [https://perma.cc/94JJ-GF9K].
41. The process did move quickly the only time that a party replaced a candidate before
an election. See Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1008–09. After Thomas Eagleton
stepped down from the vice presidential nomination in 1972, the Democratic National
Committee swiftly, and nearly unanimously, approved the replacement, who the presidential
candidate had selected. See James M. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/09/archives/
shriver-is-named-for-second-place-by-the-democrats-national.html [https://perma.cc/9MJGMNAG]. But the process probably would not be nearly as simple for filling a vacancy at the
top of the ticket.
42. Elaine C. Kamarck, Returning Peer Review to the American Presidential Nomination
Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 709, 711–12 (2018).
43. See id. at 712–14; Adam Levy, DNC Changes Superdelegate Rules in Presidential
Nomination Process, CNN (Aug. 25, 2018, 7:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/
politics/democrats-superdelegates-voting-changes/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6N5N7WQ7].
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within the last century.44 Therefore, the vice presidential nominee would
probably have many of the same policy positions that won the presidential
nominee the support of primary voters.
The vice presidential nominee is preferable to other possible designated
successors, including the candidate who finished second in the party’s
presidential primary. Given the importance of the primary process, some
might argue that it is critical to select a replacement nominee who had
received support from primary voters. But even after a close primary race, it
is possible that the runner up would have vastly different policy views from
the deceased presidential nominee—views that may have led primary voters
to vote against the runner-up.45 Additionally, the runner-up would probably
want to choose a new vice presidential candidate, which would eliminate any
continuity in the party’s ticket. Making the vice presidential candidate the
designated successor would also provide another incentive for presidential
candidates to choose vice presidential candidates who are capable of serving
as president—a critical qualification that has sometimes been undervalued.46
Admittedly, the vice presidential candidate might not always be the ideal
successor to the presidential nomination.47 Political considerations, such as
“ticket balancing,” may have been a primary consideration in the vice
presidential candidate’s selection, and the candidate’s suitability for the
presidency may not have received enough attention.48 It is also possible that
a party might be skeptical of the vice presidential candidate’s chances of
winning at the top of the ticket. Accordingly, a majority of the national
committee should be able to override the vice presidential candidate’s
succession. To select an alternate presidential nominee, the party might
employ the special committee process that is discussed below for situations
in which both the presidential and vice presidential candidates die.49
Allowing the replacement presidential nominee to select a new vice
presidential nominee, with approval from the national committee, would
recognize the importance of the working relationship between the president
and vice president.50 Presidential nominees often search for vice presidential

44. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO
SIGNIFICANCE FROM MONDALE TO BIDEN 173–74 (2016).
45. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1015.
46. See, e.g., id. at 1014 (noting that 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain
selected Sarah Palin as his running mate “without probing the depth of her knowledge on
domestic and foreign policy”).
47. Fordham Law School’s Second Presidential Succession Clinic recommended that the
vice presidential candidate only be the designated successor in the final weeks of the
campaign. Before then, a “[v]acancy committee” would suggest potential replacements to the
national committee. See id. at 1016–17.
48. See id. at 1014–15.
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. It is essential for parties to have both presidential and vice presidential candidates
because some states count votes by “ticket[s]” instead of by presidential candidate. Akhil Reed
Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap,
48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 220 (1995).
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nominees who complement their governing and managerial styles.51 That is
because the vice president has become an integral figure in most
administrations, in some cases serving as the top advisor to the president and
taking responsibility for critical initiatives.52 Recognizing the importance of
the relationship between the president and vice president, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment gave the president the discretion to nominate a replacement vice
president when there is a vacancy.53 In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s
framers cited the modern practice of the political parties allowing presidential
nominees to choose the vice presidential nominee.54
B. Death of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Nominees
For a scenario where both the presidential and vice presidential nominees
have died, the parties should consider a rule allowing a special committee to
suggest a replacement presidential nominee to the national committee, which
would need to approve the recommended candidate by majority vote.55 If
the national committee did not give its approval, the special committee could
suggest another candidate or the national committee could take it upon itself
to select a new nominee. The special committee might consist of
representatives of: (1) the party, such as the chairperson; (2) the party’s
governors and congressional leadership, such as speaker of the House, House
minority leader, and Senate majority or minority leader; and (3) the deceased
candidates’ campaign. Once the party selects a new presidential nominee,
the nominee should choose a running mate with approval from a majority of
the national committee.
The parties’ current rules do not explicitly cover a dual vacancy of the
presidential and vice presidential nominations, but the procedures for
individual vacancies would likely still work. Those procedures would call
for the respective national committees to fill both vacancies,56 with the
Republican Party’s rules providing the alternative of reconvening the
national convention.57

51. See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. WORKING GRP. ON VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION,
SELECTING A VICE PRESIDENT: ADVICE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 4 (2016).
52. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 4.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 982–83
(2010).
54. Goldstein, supra note 53, at 984.
55. This idea draws on the Second Succession Clinic’s proposal for the parties to create a
“[v]acancy committee” to suggest potential replacements to the national committee. See
Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1016–17. The parties should consider defining
the membership of a special committee in advance of when it is needed.
56. CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. III, § 1(c),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR].
57. THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2018), https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-RulesReformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2LL-FZ56].
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A scenario where the national committee needed to select replacements for
both spots on the party’s ticket at the same time could be even more unwieldy
and time consuming under the current rules than filling a sole vacancy. A
special committee with far fewer members than the national committee might
streamline the process. There might still be disagreement among the special
committee, but its smaller size would probably facilitate meaningful dialogue
and deliberation.
Including at least some of the party’s governors and congressional leaders
on the committee would add democratic accountability because those
officials are elected. Consultation with governors and congressional leaders
on filling vacancies is already called for by the party’s Procedural Rules of
the 2020 Democratic National Convention.58 The officials from the deceased
candidate’s campaign would help ensure that their candidate’s vision, which
primary voters endorsed, would be reflected in the choice of a replacement.
C. Inability of the Presidential Nominee
The political parties should consider authorizing the vice presidential
nominee and the special committee described above to declare presidential
nominees unable. An inability declaration should require a two-thirds vote
from the special committee and approval from the vice presidential nominee.
The presidential nominee should be allowed to appeal an inability
determination to the national committee, which would then need to ratify the
inability determination by a two-thirds vote.59 If a presidential nominee were
removed for inability, the vice presidential nominee should become the
presidential nominee and pick a new running mate with majority approval
from the national committee. To avoid this process, candidates who
recognized that they were unable could simply resign.
Both parties’ current rules envision candidate disability, but they do not
define “disability” or provide a way to determine its existence. The
Democratic Party’s rules explicitly mention “disability,”60 while the
Republican Party’s rules recognize that vacancies in the party’s nominations
“may occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise.”61 The “otherwise”
language is best understood as encompassing a wide range of contingencies
that make a candidate unavailable, certainly including disability.62
58. PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE 2020 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION r. F,
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-PermanentConvention-Rules-of-Procedure-7.30.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYD6-HJED].
59. For an analysis of the merits of a lawsuit filed by a candidate to challenge removal
from the ticket, see Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1018–20.
60. PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE 2020 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION r. F,
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-PermanentConvention-Rules-of-Procedure-7.30.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYD6-HJED].
61. THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2018), https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-RulesReformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2LL-FZ56].
62. See Brian C. Kalt, The Rules for Displacing an Ailing Presidential Candidate,
LAWFARE (Oct. 4, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/rules-displacing-ailingpresidential-candidate [https://perma.cc/QA24-REDF].
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Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the Constitution, like
the political parties’ rules, lacked a definition for presidential inability or a
process for declaring it.63 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers declined
to add a definition, preferring instead to create processes for determining
inability.64 The amendment’s Section 3 allows the president to voluntarily
declare himself disabled, while Section 4 lets the vice president and a
majority of the Cabinet or another body created by Congress declare the
president unable.65
Although different considerations exist in the pre-inaugural period, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability procedures provide some insights for
crafting candidate inability procedures. Additionally, use of an inability
process similar to one in the Constitution might encourage the public to view
the process as legitimate. The amendment’s framers made the vice president
an indispensable participant in the Section 4 process partially because the
vice president would take over in the event of the president’s removal from
the office’s powers and duties.66 For the same reason, it would be sensible
to involve the vice presidential nominee in an inability determination, if the
parties made the vice presidential nominee the automatic successor to the
presidential nomination, as this Article suggests the parties consider.
Empowering the person in the second spot to take part in a process that
could move that person to the top of the ticket might appear to create a
conflict of interest. But the political repercussions would probably be severe
for taking part in a removal that the public deemed unwarranted. And,
historically, vice presidents have been hesitant to initiate transfers of power,
even when it might have been necessary.67
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment involves the president’s Cabinet secretaries
in an inability determination for several reasons. The members of the Cabinet
are presumably political allies of the president who would be unlikely to
improperly participate in declaring the president unable.68 Additionally, the
Cabinet secretaries’ work and interactions with the president might give them
information about the president’s health.69 These considerations also support
involving the vice presidential nominee and representatives of the campaign
in declaring the presidential candidate unable. Consultation with doctors and
other relevant medical experts should inform inability determinations where
necessary, just as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers expected the
Cabinet and vice president to seek expert input.70

63.
64.
65.
66.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 928; Goldstein, supra note 53, at 994.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4.
John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34
FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 202 (1965).
67. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability: Filling in the Gaps, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI.,
no. 2, 2014, at 11, 13–14.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 23.
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Giving elected officials and the vice presidential nominee a role in
determining presidential candidate inability would add accountability to the
process. The lawmakers who designed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
believed the decision-makers must be accountable to the public.71 Elected
officials are accountable to their constituents, and the vice presidential
nominee is accountable to voters on Election Day.
“Disability” should not be defined in the rules for the same reason it is left
undefined in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: to provide flexibility.72 Not all
of the conditions that might merit use of the disability procedures are
predictable, making it important for the decision-makers to have discretion.
But the rules should make it difficult to remove candidates for all but the
most serious ailments. Deference to the presidential candidate reflects the
importance of the popular mandate the candidate received from primary
voters. Allowing the presidential candidate to appeal a disability
determination to the national committee would provide a critical check. And
requiring the national committee to ratify a disability determined by a
two-thirds vote would weight the process in the candidate’s favor—just as
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s appeal provision is tilted toward the
president.73
Removal of a presidential nominee should be permanent. Although it is
important to maximize the possibility that the candidate who primary voters
choose will be on the ballot, multiple changes to a party’s national ticket in
the weeks before Election Day risk confusing voters and preventing many
from casting informed votes.
D. Inability of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Nominees
The parties should consider allowing the special committee to handle
scenarios where both the presidential nominee and vice presidential nominee
become disabled. Both nominees should be allowed to appeal the decision
to the national committee. After both candidates have been removed from
the ticket, the special committee should suggest a replacement presidential
nominee to the national committee. Following approval from the national
committee of a new presidential nominee, the nominee should choose a new
vice presidential candidate.
The process for declaring a dual inability should closely mirror the process
for declaring an inability of the presidential nominee, and the process for
selecting a replacement should be the same as the replacement process for
when both candidates die. The only difference would be that the unable vice
presidential nominee would not participate in the inability declaration.
A dual inability is a remote possibility, but it is still important to provide
for it. The presidential succession framework currently lacks a procedure for
71. Goldstein, supra note 53, at 992–93.
72. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 928. The terms “disability” and
“inability” are used interchangeably here.
73. An inability determination must receive approval from two-thirds of both houses of
Congress if the appeal process is triggered. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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a dual inability of the president and vice president.74 The vulnerability
created by this gap was highlighted in October 2020 when President Trump
contracted COVID-19 and Vice President Pence was at risk of falling ill.75
At the time, Trump and Pence were the Republican nominees for president
and vice president.
E. Vice Presidential Nominee Death and Inability
If the vice presidential candidate dies, the parties should consider allowing
the presidential candidate to choose a replacement nominee with approval
from a majority of the national committee. To declare a vice presidential
nominee unable, the presidential nominee should act with a majority of the
special committee. The presidential nominee should then fill the vacancy on
the ticket’s second spot with approval from a majority of the national
committee.
F. Delaying the Election
In some candidate death or inability scenarios, it might make sense to delay
the election.76 An election should only be delayed when absolutely
necessary. None of the United States’s fifty-nine presidential elections has
been postponed.77 That no level of turmoil—including a civil war78—has
prevented on-time presidential elections is a sign of the strength of the
nation’s democracy. And conducting elections as scheduled has more than
symbolic value. A candidate could seek to delay an election as part of an
attempt to undermine the democratic process. Nonetheless, allowing voters
to make informed choices is integral to democracy, and candidate death or
inability immediately before an election might make it hard for voters to learn
about replacement candidate(s). If a vacancy happened especially close to
an election, a delay might be necessary for the party to follow an adequate
process for selecting replacement(s).
An election delay would need to be coordinated at the national level
because the date of presidential elections is set by federal law.79 Congress

74. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 958–59; Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do
If Simultaneous Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1027, 1030 (2017).
75. Garrett M. Graff, The Real Nightmare Scenario: A Sick Mike Pence, POLITICO
(Oct. 2, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/02/pence-trumpcovid-coronavirus-sick-425329 [https://perma.cc/SD3A-UZS4].
76. See Amar, supra note 50, at 222–23.
77. Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?, 32 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 523, 524 (2005).
78. Becky Little, How the Union Pulled Off a Presidential Election During the Civil War,
HIST. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/civil-war-presidential-election-abrahamlincoln [https://perma.cc/WB48-3575].
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the
Electors .”); 3 U.S.C. § 7; CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32654, SAFEGUARDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS
FROM POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACK: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2–3 (2004).
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also has the power to postpone the meeting of the Electoral College,80 which
might be necessary if Election Day were pushed back. Inauguration Day
cannot be changed by legislation; the Constitution requires that it occur on
January 20 in the year after an election.81 Any election delay due to a
candidate death or inability should be brief. For the orderly transfer of power
to occur in January, the winning candidate’s transition work should ideally
begin in November.82
Congress might pass a law providing a mechanism for an automatic delay
of an election if a candidate death or inability happened close to an election.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has suggested such an approach. He proposed
the chief justice of the United States as a possible official to certify that a
death or inability had occurred in order to trigger a delay.83 Another
possibility is the appointment of a commission to handle potential delays.
Professor Jerry Goldfeder has previously proposed using a commission to
decide on postponing an election in the event of a terrorist attack.84 He
outlined two possible commissions for Congress to consider creating: one
with representatives of the parties and any independent candidates and
another with congressional leaders.85 A hybrid approach with both
congressional leaders and party representatives is also worth consideration.
The party representatives could provide input on whether a delay is necessary
for their party to select new candidates, while the elected officials could make
the commission’s decision more accountable to the public.
G. Candidate Health Disclosures
Transparency about primary candidates’ health might reduce the chances
that prospective candidates who are at high risk of serious medical issues will
decide to run—possibly making it less likely that the parties would ever need
to use the vacancy procedures. Furthermore, voters deserve to know at least
some information about candidates’ health. Unfortunately, candidates have
not always been forthcoming.86 Incentivizing transparency, as opposed to
requiring it, might be most realistic. Approaches that merit consideration are
80. See 3 U.S.C. § 7. Moving the date of the Electoral College meeting would
automatically push back the “safe harbor” date, when states must certify their vote counts to
guarantee that Congress will accept their results. The safe harbor date is “six days before the
time fixed for the meeting of the electors.” Id. § 5.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
82. See Tom Wheeler, With Only 11 Weeks, A Transition Delayed Is a Transition Denied,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/
11/18/with-only-11-weeks-a-transition-delayed-is-a-transition-denied/
[https://perma.cc/MK5D-5ZC3].
83. Amar, supra note 50, at 222–23.
84. Goldfeder, supra note 77, at 563–64.
85. Id.
86. MEGHA DHARIA ET AL., FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF L., DEMOCRACY AND THE CONST.
CLINIC, WHAT SHOULD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TELL US ABOUT THEMSELVES?:
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 14–18 (2020),
https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/14399/What_Should_Presidential_Candi
dates_Tell_Us_About_Themselves___Democracy_Clinic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJP8DM44]; Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 988–97.
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a commission that establishes standards for health disclosures, which
Fordham Law School’s Second Clinic on Presidential Succession
recommended,87 or a commission that conducts voluntary exams of
candidates, which Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution
Clinic recommended.88
II. DEATH OR INABILITY AFTER ELECTION DAY BUT BEFORE THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE
There are no established procedures for candidate death or inability after
Election Day but before the Electoral College meeting. On Election Day,
voters technically cast ballots for electors, not presidential or vice
presidential candidates.89 The political parties choose their electors in each
state before the election.90 If candidates died or became disabled after the
election, their parties might attempt to instruct the electors to vote for certain
replacements when the electors cast their votes about a month-and-a-half
after Election Day. That is what happened when Horace Greeley died shortly
after the 1872 election.91 Whether electors would or could follow such
instructions is unclear.
A. Electors’ Varying Authority in Death and Inability Scenarios
Thirty-three states and Washington, D.C., have “faithless elector” laws
that prohibit electors from exercising discretion in casting their votes.92 The
rest of the states allow electors to vote how they choose, though it is very rare
for unbound electors to vote for anyone other than the presidential and vice
presidential candidates who won the popular votes in their states.93 But that
norm might be disrupted by candidate death or disability; the electors might
follow instructions from their political party or vote for a candidate of their
own choosing.
Different wording in states’ faithless elector laws appears to create varying
requirements for electors when candidates die or become disabled. In
thirteen states and Washington, D.C., electors are required to vote for their

87. See Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1003–07.
88. DHARIA ET AL., supra note 86, at 18–20.
89. John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 2 (1968).
90. Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and Overview,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 969 (2016).
91. First Succession Clinic, supra note 13, at 56 n.246.
92. Faithless
Elector
State
Laws,
FAIRVOTE
(July
7,
2020),
https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_elector_state_laws [https://perma.cc/F7RS-8C4C].
93. Hans A. von Spakovsky & Zack Smith, “Faithless Electors” Won’t Affect Any
Presidential Election, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 13, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/electionintegrity/commentary/faithless-electors-wont-affect-any-presidential-election
[https://perma.cc/7QJS-FQEY] (stating that there have only been 180 faithless electors “out
of more than 23,000 electoral votes, or only one-half of 1 percent”).
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party’s candidate or nominee.94 These laws would probably require electors
to vote for a replacement candidate chosen by the electors’ party, even if their
party selected the replacement after the election. The replacements would
become the parties’ candidates or nominees for whom the electors are
required to vote by law. Virginia’s law requires electors to vote for “the
nominees of the national convention to which the state convention elects
delegates.”95 Unless a political party reconvened its convention to fill a
vacancy, which the Republican National Committee’s rules do provide as an
option, electors in Virginia might not be required to vote for replacement
candidates.
Fifteen states have faithless elector laws that would require electors to vote
for a dead or disabled candidate. Not all of those laws, however, impose a
penalty for faithless votes, though some call for the automatic cancellation of
faithless votes. The laws in nine of those states require electors to vote for
the winner of the popular vote in the state. In four states, the laws demand
that electors vote for the candidate for whom they agreed to serve. And, in
two states, the electors must vote for the candidates who appear on their
parties’ ballots on Election Day. None of these laws make exceptions for
candidate death or inability.96
Some laws have explicit or implicit exceptions. Hawaii and Tennessee
require electors to vote for their parties’ nominees “if both candidates are
alive.”97 Electors in Utah must vote for their parties’ nominees, “except in
the cases of death or felony conviction of a candidate.”98 The Wisconsin
statute states, “A presidential elector is not required to vote for a candidate
who is deceased at the time of the meeting [of the Electoral College].”99
B. Challenges to Reform
Requiring electors to vote for the popular vote winners, including when
candidates die or become disabled, is the approach that is most consistent
with the principles underlying the modern presidential election system.100
Although the Constitution’s framers envisioned the electors deliberating to
select the president, they have virtually never done so.101 “Almost
immediately, presidential electors became trusty transmitters of other
people’s decisions,” the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Chiafalo v.
Washington.102 In Chiafalo, which was decided in July 2020, the Court
94. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF SECRETARIES OF STATE SUMMARY: STATE LAWS
REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS (2020), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/
2020-10/summary-electoral-college-laws-Oct20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JCS-45MS].
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. This suggestion is inspired by Professor Amar’s slightly different proposal for a law
requiring Congress to count electoral votes for dead candidates. Amar, supra note 50, at 222.
101. See JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 3–5 (2020).
102. 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020).
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upheld the constitutionality of state faithless elector statutes that bar electors
from exercising their own discretion.103 The Court based its ruling in part on
the “established practice” of the Electoral College serving as “a mechanism
not for deliberation but for party-line voting.”104
Because electors do not have a consequential part in selecting the president
and vice president, most voters pay no attention to who they are. They are
chosen by the leaders of their state political parties and may not represent the
views of voters who cast ballots for their parties’ candidates. Allowing
electors to intervene to select replacements for dead or disabled candidates
would be undemocratic and inconsistent with how the Electoral College
works in practice.
It is also undesirable for political parties to be involved in choosing
replacements. The parties could use the same processes described in their
party rules to choose new candidates for the electors to support. In 1912,
Republican electors followed instructions from their party to vote for a
replacement for James Sherman, the vice presidential nominee who died
shortly before his ticket lost the election.105 But replacements named by a
party would not necessarily be representative of the will of the voters. If the
political parties chose replacement candidates before the election, voters
would still be able to register their preferences, which adds a measure of
accountability and legitimacy. Voters would obviously no longer have that
opportunity after Election Day. Prioritizing voters’ input is consistent with
the diminished role of party establishments in selecting presidential
nominees.106
State laws that require electors to vote for dead or disabled candidates
would recognize that the Electoral College process is a formality.107 This
approach would allow for candidate death and inability scenarios to be
resolved in the same way from Election Day to the inauguration. After
electors voted for a deceased or disabled candidate, the candidate would
become president-elect or vice president-elect for the purposes of the
Twentieth Amendment, and the amendment’s succession procedures would
apply.108
However, this policy would raise legal and policy concerns. First, it is
unclear whether states have authority to require electors to vote for dead
candidates. In Chiafalo, the Supreme Court left the issue unresolved, stating
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2328–29.
See id. at 2326–27.
See Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1008.
See DAISY DE WOLFF ET AL., FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF L., DEMOCRACY AND THE CONST.
CLINIC, SELECTING REPRESENTATIVE AND QUALIFIED CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT: PROPOSALS
TO
REFORM
PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARIES
8–9
(Jan.
2021),
https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/15276/selecting_representative_and_qual
ified_candidates_for_president.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZFE-ZV73].
107. Reflecting the Electoral College’s mechanical function, at least one federal law states
that a candidate becomes “President-Elect” based on the Election Day outcome, not the
meeting of the Electoral College. See The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 § 3(c), Pub. L.
No. 88-277, 78 Stat. 153, 154 (1964) (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 102 note).
108. See infra Part III.A.
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that its decision should not be interpreted to allow faithless elector statutes
that mandate electoral votes for deceased candidates.109
Second, Congress’s decision to not count Greeley’s electoral votes after
the 1872 election set a precedent that a future Congress might cite to avoid
counting the votes for a dead candidate.110 But the Greeley precedent might
not be difficult to overcome. Professor Amar suggests that Congress should
undo the precedent by passing a law requiring the counting of electoral votes
for dead candidates.111 Even without a law, the Greeley precedent might not
be entitled to much weight. Professor Joel Goldstein calls it “extremely
weak” because Congress hardly debated its decision and Greeley had lost the
election decisively, making the counting of his electoral votes
inconsequential under the circumstances.112
Third, the Constitution’s text might be interpreted to prevent electors from
voting for candidates who have died. Professor Goldstein highlights this
concern, observing that the Twelfth Amendment authorizes electors to vote
for a “person,” which might not include a decedent.113 This issue could give
Congress another reason not to count electoral votes for dead candidates and
it could provide a basis for opposing candidates to file lawsuits.
Fourth, if both the winning presidential and vice presidential candidates
died, casting electoral votes for them would lead to the speaker of the House,
the next official in the line of succession, becoming acting president on
Inauguration Day.114 This outcome would be highly undemocratic if the
speaker of the House did not belong to the same party as the deceased
candidates. The party that lost the presidential election would have the
opportunity to hold the White House for a full four-year term.
Given these concerns, other alternatives deserve consideration. One
possibility is for states’ faithless elector statutes to require electors to vote for
the vice presidential candidate for president if the presidential candidate dies.
The electors might also be required to vote for a new vice presidential
candidate named by the new presidential candidate. But giving a presidential
candidate unchecked authority to name a vice presidential candidate is
inconsistent with the vice presidential replacement process in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which requires assent from majorities of both
houses of Congress.115 The dual death scenarios are even more vexing
because the only alternatives might be to allow the parties or electors to name
replacements, which would be problematic for the reasons discussed.116

109. 140 S. Ct. at 2328 n.8.
110. See Brian Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks: Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, 54
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 112 (2017).
111. Amar, supra note 50, at 222.
112. Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
67, 76–77 n.32 (2010).
113. Id. at 76.
114. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
116. See supra Part I.B.
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The challenges related to candidate death and inability between Election
Day and the casting of electoral votes stem from the Electoral College
system’s flaws.117 The only complete solution may come from abolishing
the Electoral College, which would require a constitutional amendment.
III. DEATH OR INABILITY AFTER THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE
The Twentieth Amendment provides for succession contingencies
involving the president-elect and vice president-elect. Lawmakers who
designed the amendment believed candidates became president-elect and
vice president-elect after the Electoral College vote in mid-December, as
opposed to after Congress’s counting of the electoral votes on January 6.118
This interpretation is not universally accepted,119 but it makes practical sense
for the purposes of the Twentieth Amendment. The Twelfth Amendment
requires Congress to count electoral votes for candidates who die after the
electors cast their votes.120 Therefore, the Twentieth Amendment’s
provisions will inevitably apply to candidates who die after the Electoral
College meeting, no matter the definition of president-elect and vice
president-elect. The procedures for death of presidential and vice
presidential candidates are clear in most cases, but there is ambiguity when
it comes to the amendment’s treatment of inability.
A. Death of President-Elect and/or Vice President-Elect
If the president-elect dies, the Twentieth Amendment provides that the
vice president-elect becomes president on Inauguration Day.121 The
Twentieth Amendment extends the Constitution’s designation of the vice
president as the first successor to the presidency into the pre-inaugural
period.122 There is no process for selecting a new vice president-elect; as
soon as the president takes office, he or she could use the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to appoint a vice president with approval from Congress. 123
The Twentieth Amendment does not explicitly provide for the death of
both the president-elect and vice president-elect. But that contingency is
almost certainly covered by Section 3, which states, in part, “Congress may
by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualified.”124 A failure to “qualify” was intended
to cover any contingency that made the president-elect and vice

117. See John D. Feerick, The Electoral College: Time for a Change?, 90 FORDHAM L.
REV. 395 (2021); Goldstein, supra note 112, at 74–75.
118. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 6 (1932).
119. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22992, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT: SUCCESSION AND
DISABILITY ISSUES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD 4 (2012).
120. See FEERICK, supra note 14, at 273–74.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
122. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV, § 1.
123. Id. amend. XXV, § 2.
124. Id. amend. XX, § 3.
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president-elect unavailable to take the oath of office on Inauguration Day;125
such contingencies certainly include death.126 Congress has passed a law
pursuant to this power. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947127
designates successors for when the president-elect and vice president-elect
fail to qualify.128 In that scenario, the speaker of the House would be sworn
in to act as president.129 If there were no speaker, the Senate president pro
tempore would become acting president.130 The rest of the line of succession
comprises the heads of the executive departments.131 Cabinet secretaries
who were still in office in this scenario would have been appointed during
the prior presidential term.
Congress should change the line of succession for pre-inaugural
contingencies to guarantee that the legislative leaders of the president-elect’s
party are the successors. The current line of succession could lead to the
undemocratic result of the party that lost the presidential election taking the
White House on Inauguration Day because the speaker and president pro
tempore are not always members of the president-elect’s party.
A revised line of succession should provide that the speaker of the House
is the first in the statutory line of succession when the president-elect and
speaker of the House belong to the same party. When they are from different
parties, the House minority leader should be first in the line.132 The president
pro tempore should not be in the line of succession. It is customarily a
position held by the most senior member of the majority party in the Senate,
meaning the president pro tempore, while distinguished, is almost always in
the twilight of their career and not necessarily prepared to assume the
responsibilities of the presidency.133 When the Senate is held by the
president-elect’s party, the Senate majority leader should be second in the
statutory line of succession. Otherwise, the Senate minority leader should be
second.134
Some proposals for reforming the presidential line of succession would
remove legislators. Under these proposals, members of the Cabinet would
comprise all or most of the line of succession.135 There are compelling
arguments for removing legislators from the line of succession,136 especially
because they may not be constitutionally eligible successors to the presidency
125. See Proposed Constitutional Amendment: Hearing Before the Comm. on Election of
President, Vice President and Representatives in Congress, 72d Cong. 9–10 (1932).
126. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 9 (1932); see also Goldstein, supra note 53, at 1034.
127. Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19).
128. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; 3 U.S.C. § 19(b).
131. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1).
132. See Feerick, supra note 67, at 19.
133. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 946–47.
134. See Feerick, supra note 67, at 19.
135. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 952; First Succession Clinic, supra note
13, at 46–47; CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 45–46 (2009).
136. See Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 946–50.

2021]

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DEATH AND INABILITY

603

when vacancies occur after the inauguration.137 But these proposals are
focused on vacancies in the presidency and vice presidency. In a scenario
where the president-elect and vice president-elect die, they could not appoint
members of the Cabinet, making a Cabinet line of succession impractical.
Additionally, concerns about the constitutionality of legislative succession
would not exist in the pre-inaugural period because the Twentieth
Amendment appears to allow a broader range of people to act as president in
the event of vacancies during this time. Article II limits post-inauguration
successors to “Officer[s],”138 who some argue are only Senate-confirmed
executive branch officials.139 The Twentieth Amendment uses a more
general term for potential pre-inauguration successors: “person[s].”140
B. Inability of the President-Elect and/or Vice President-Elect
Inability of the president-elect or vice president-elect is covered by the
Twentieth Amendment. Although the amendment’s text does not mention
inability, the legislative history strongly suggests that the “failure to qualify”
language encompasses inability.141 Accordingly, in cases where the
president-elect is unable, the vice president-elect becomes acting president
on Inauguration Day and serves in that capacity until the inability ends and
the president assumes office.142 However, there is no clear procedure for
declaring the existence of an inability.
The vice president-elect might have the authority to make an inability
declaration. Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided procedures for
declaring presidential inabilities, some scholars suggested that the
“contingent grant of power theory” gave the vice president authority to
determine that the president was disabled.143 That theory holds that the
person who is empowered to act in a certain circumstance, such as by
discharging the presidency’s powers and duties, has the power to determine
whether that circumstance exists.144 Yet, the contingent grant of power
theory does not provide the unquestionable legal basis that should exist for
transfer of presidential authority.
Congress should pass a law for declaring the president-elect unable. A
procedure would help ensure that there was someone to ably discharge the
powers of the presidency immediately at the start of a new term.
Additionally, an incapacitated president would not be able to appoint a
137. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995). But see Goldstein, supra note 53, at 1019–
20.
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
139. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 949.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
141. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5–6 (1932); Proposed Constitutional Amendment,
supra note 125, at 8–9 (statement of Rep. Clarence F. Lea); see also Marcello Figueroa,
Revisiting § 3 of the Twentieth Amendment 2 (Dec. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
143. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 963.
144. Id.
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Cabinet, which would complicate the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s use if the
president was not an incumbent.145 One possibility is to authorize the vice
president-elect and congressional leaders of the president-elect’s party146 to
make the declaration. This procedure should be reserved for the most
unambiguous cases of inability, such as those involving unconsciousness, so
approval from the vice president-elect and all of the congressional leaders
might be required. And the president-elect might be given unilateral
authority to declare an inability over.
The Twentieth Amendment does not provide explicit authorization for
Congress to create a procedure for declaring inabilities. But because a
procedure is essential to make the amendment function, the Necessary and
Proper Clause should provide a sufficient basis for creating a procedure.147
Congress should also create a process for declaring a dual inability of both
the president-elect and vice president-elect. Congressional leaders of the
president-elect’s party and the person who is next in the line of succession—
typically the speaker of the House—might be empowered to approve an
inability determination.
C. Contingent Election Gaps
There are no procedures for candidate death or inability in a situation
where Congress must choose the winner of the presidential or vice
presidential race in a “contingent election.” Contingent elections occur when
no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes.148 If no candidate
receives a majority in the presidential contest, the Twelfth Amendment lets
the House of Representatives choose the winner from the three candidates
who received the most electoral votes. In a House-contingent election, each
state delegation receives one vote, and the candidate who receives a majority
of all of the states wins. The Senate is responsible for choosing a vice
president if none of the candidates win a majority of electoral votes. Senators
select from the top two candidates, and each senator has one vote, with a
majority required to prevail.149
The Twentieth Amendment’s Section 4 authorizes Congress to pass a law
providing procedures for “death of any of the persons” from whom the House

145. Acting secretaries remaining from the prior administration could probably participate,
but it would be undesirable because they would not be allies of the president. See John Rogan,
Trump Has a Lot of Temps in Top Jobs. Would They Get a Say in Removing Him from His?,
WASH. POST (July 22, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2019/07/22/trump-has-lot-temps-top-jobs-would-they-get-say-removing-him-his/
[https://perma.cc/DL6F-QYM2].
146. The statute might allow independent candidates who are not members of a party to
designate individuals to participate in declaring them unable.
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; cf. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 963.
148. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40504, CONTINGENT ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY CONGRESS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
1 (2020).
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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or Senate may choose in contingent elections.150 But Congress has not done
so since the Twentieth Amendment was ratified in 1933.151
The most sensible, yet flawed, law for the death of a presidential candidate
in a contingent election would provide for a deceased presidential candidate’s
running mate to become the replacement presidential candidate. This
approach, which Professor Brian Kalt recommends,152 would automatically
provide a replacement presidential candidate and avoid the undemocratic
option of letting a political party or electors choose a replacement after voters
have cast their ballots. It would also recognize the vice president’s role as
the first successor to the presidency.
Complications arise because the running mate would probably be a
candidate for the vice presidency in the Senate-contingent election.153 If the
running mate stepped down from the vice presidential candidacy to become
the presidential candidate, the running mate’s party would not be represented
in the Senate-contingent election. Not only would the party not have a
chance to win the vice presidency, it would be out of contention for the
presidency if the House-contingent election resulted in a deadlock.
Whether legal authority exists to name a replacement to run in the Senate
in this scenario is unclear. Section 4’s first clause gives Congress the
authority to “provide for” the death of a presidential candidate, and its second
clause gives authority to “provide for” the death of a vice presidential
candidate.154 Because death is the only contingency listed, a narrow reading
might indicate that Congress can only authorize naming a replacement when
the vice presidential candidate dies. However, a broader interpretation could
support naming a new vice presidential candidate as part of the authority to
“provide for” the death of the presidential candidate.
An alternative to naming a replacement vice presidential candidate is for
the running mate to be a candidate in both the House- and Senate-contingent
elections.155 If the running mate won in both the House and the Senate, the
running mate could vacate the vice president-elect position. Then, after
taking office as president, that individual could nominate a vice president
150. Id. amend. XX, § 4.
151. Former Senator Paul Simon proposed legislation on this issue in the 1990s. Kalt,
supra note 110, at 118–19. In June 2020, Senator Rob Portman introduced legislation to create
a panel of experts to recommend a Section 4 policy. See S. 3950, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020).
Senator Portman cosponsored similar legislation in 2021 with a bipartisan group of members
from the House and Senate. Press Release, Portman, King Introduce the Bipartisan, Bicameral
SOLVE ACT to Help Establish an Appropriate Process in the Event of a Candidate’s Death
in an Contingent Presidential Election (July 22, 2021), https://www.portman.senate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/portman-king-introduce-bipartisan-bicameral-solve-act-helpestablish [https://perma.cc/N7LY-2VBK].
152. Kalt, supra note 110, at 128–29, 142. Senator Simon’s legislation also took this
approach. Id. at 128.
153. If the presidential and vice presidential candidates’ ticket received the third most
electoral votes, the presidential candidate would be eligible for the House contingent election,
but the vice presidential candidate would not be eligible for the Senate contingent election.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4.
155. Kalt, supra note 110, at 129.
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through the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s process. Even though the
Constitution clearly does not envision the president and vice president being
the same person,156 there is no explicit constitutional prohibition against this
arrangement. But it could still invite lawsuits that would call into question
the legitimacy of the election’s outcome.
Congress should “provide for” the sole death of a vice presidential
candidate before a contingent election by allowing the presidential candidate
to name a replacement. This policy would embrace the discretion presidents
have to choose their vice presidents. The Senate would provide a meaningful
check, similar to how Congress must approve a replacement vice president
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment157 and how the political parties must
support the presidential candidate’s vice presidential pick.158
For a scenario in which both the presidential candidate and the vice
presidential candidate died, the only realistic option might be for Congress
to pass a law allowing the deceased candidates’ party (or electors for
independent candidates) to name new presidential and vice presidential
candidates. Allowing the political parties to replace candidates after an
election is far from ideal. A party could choose a replacement who was more
politically extreme than the original candidate. And the possibility of a
candidate taking office as president without winning any popular votes raises
serious democratic legitimacy concerns. Accordingly, Congress might
consider requiring approval for a party’s replacement from that party’s
congressional leaders.
If a presidential candidate or vice presidential candidate became physically
or mentally unable, the candidate should still participate in a contingent
election. If an unable candidate won a contingent election, a process like the
one suggested earlier for declaring inabilities in presidents-elect and vice
presidents-elect could be employed.159
D. Inauguration Day Vulnerability
A catastrophic incident on Inauguration Day could unleash a precarious
succession scenario. On Inauguration Day, the outgoing and incoming
president and vice president traditionally convene at the Capitol for the
swearing-in ceremony.160 The two legislative leaders who are the next in the
presidential line of succession—the speaker of the House and the Senate
156. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XII; id. amend. XXV, § 2.
157. Id. amend. XXV, § 2.
158. See, e.g., Russell Berman, A Vice Presidential Free-for-All?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/trump-gop-runningmate-convention-delegates/478992/ [https://perma.cc/J5R7-AS62].
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. Donald Trump’s failure to attend the 2021 swearing-in ceremony marked the first time
in a century-and-a-half that an outgoing president did not attend his successor’s inauguration.
Ayesha Rascoe, For First Time In 150 Years, Outgoing President Doesn’t Attend
Inauguration, NPR (Jan. 20, 2021, 4:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/
20/958905703/for-1st-time-in-150-years-outgoing-president-doesnt-attend-inauguration
[https://perma.cc/4RTS-X38E].
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president pro tempore—are typically there, too.161 If all of those officials
were killed or incapacitated in an attack, the line of succession would reach
the leaders of the Cabinet departments. But, when a new president is taking
office, almost all of the outgoing Cabinet secretaries normally resign by noon
on Inauguration Day,162 which is the time set by the Twentieth Amendment
for the end of the presidential term.163
Before the Senate confirms the new president’s Cabinet secretaries, the
departments are led by acting secretaries, whose eligibility as presidential
successors is questionable. The line of succession statute and its legislative
history leave the matter unaddressed.164 Since the statute does not explicitly
bar them from acting as president, an acting secretary probably would serve
in that capacity after an Inauguration Day catastrophe—if only because there
would be no other officials who were even arguably eligible. Of course, that
outcome is far from ideal—and not only because of the eligibility ambiguity.
Acting secretaries are lower-ranking officials who might be ill-suited to serve
as president. Additionally, an acting secretary might be from a different
political party than the president-elect.
An acting secretary would serve as president until the House chose a new
speaker or the Senate chose new a president pro tempore.165 That process
could take time, especially given that many members of both chambers
probably would have been at the inauguration and, as a result, in harm’s way.
Prior administrations have recognized the Inauguration Day succession
vulnerability. In fact, officials confronted the possibility of an attack on the
2009 swearing-in ceremony, when intelligence revealed a potentially
credible terrorist bomb plot. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who was slated
to remain in his post in the new administration, did not attend the ceremony
as a precaution.166 In 2017, President Barack Obama’s Homeland Security
secretary remained in office and stayed away from incoming President
Trump’s swearing-in. President pro tempore Orrin Hatch also avoided the
gathering.167 It is not publicly known whether similar precautions were taken
for the 2021 Inauguration,168 which occurred only two weeks after a mob
stormed the Capitol, with some in the crowd rampaging over the platform
constructed for the inauguration.169
161. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 956.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
164. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 954–56.
165. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
166. Peter Baker, Obama’s War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html
[https://perma.cc/CM85B9ZD].
167. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 957.
168. Patricia Kime, Who Was the Designated Survivor for the Inauguration?: Outgoing
Administration Doesn’t Say, MILITARY (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.military.com/dailynews/2021/01/20/who-was-designated-survivor-inauguration-outgoing-administrationdoesnt-say.html [https://perma.cc/68Q9-JCRV].
169. Will Weissert, Capitol Siege Raises Security Worries for Biden Inauguration,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 8, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-
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The practice of a member of the outgoing president’s Cabinet serving as a
designated survivor is sensible, but it leaves open the possibility of an official
from the party that lost the election taking over as acting president. A better
policy has been recommended by Fordham Law School’s Second
Presidential Succession Clinic and the Continuity of Government
Commission. Their proposal would involve the Senate confirming some of
the incoming president’s top-ranking Cabinet secretaries shortly before the
inauguration.170 Then, some or all of the newly confirmed department heads
could wait out the ceremony off-site.
CONCLUSION
The 2020 election cycle and many before it illustrate an unfortunate
reality: threats to the health and safety of presidential and vice presidential
candidates are real. Congress and the political parties should give careful
consideration to improving and supplementing the procedures for
pre-inaugural succession and inability.

politics-health-inaugurations-703c3445fd280831c68a85b61393a500
[https://perma.cc/XDP5-UT9K].
170. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 957; CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N,
supra note 135, at 49.

